opinion of all the Member States, was excluded, while leaving open the questions which were controversial.
In these paragraphs, he first says that the Convention in no way restricts the freedom of parties to submit disputes to arbitration.
14 This applies, he says, even to those matters with regard to which the Convention lays down rules of exclusive jurisdiction. 15 On the other hand, he says, this does not prevent national legislation from invalidating arbitration agreements affecting such matters.
He next says (as does Jenard) that the Convention does not cover court proceedings ancillary to arbitration proceedings. He gives the following examples:
 the appointment or dismissal of arbitrators;  the fixing of the place of arbitration;  the extension of the time limit for making awards; or  the obtaining of preliminary rulings on questions of substantive law.
He goes on to say that the Convention also does not apply to court proceedings to determine the validity of an arbitration agreement or, when it is found to be invalid, an order by the court that the parties must not continue the arbitration proceedings. 16 In his final paragraph on the matter, 17 Professor Schlosser says that the Convention does not apply to court proceedings concerning the revocation, amendment, recognition or enforcement of awards, nor does it apply to judgments incorporating awards. He then adds the following sentence:
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If an arbitration award is revoked and the revoking court or another national court itself decides the subject matter in dispute, the 1968 [Brussels] Convention is applicable.
This seems to mean that a judgment given after the revocation of the award must be recognized and enforced under the Convention, even if the courts of the Contracting State in which recognition is sought would regard the award (and the arbitration agreement on which it was based) as valid. Since the decision revoking the award (or any decision on the validity of the arbitration agreement) is, in Schlosser's view, outside the scope of the Convention, 19 courts in other Contracting States are entitled to form their own view on the matter: they are not bound by a decision of a court in another Contracting State. This sentence in the Report seems, therefore, to be inconsistent with the British view that the Convention does not apply to court proceedings regarding a dispute which, in the eyes of courts of other Contracting States, is covered by an arbitration agreement.
Reading between the lines, one can perhaps discern the solution supported by the Report: first, the Convention does not apply to a ruling on the validity or applicability of an arbitration 14 Paragraph 63. 15 Disputes concerning title to land would constitute an example: see Article 16(1) of the Convention (Article 22(1) of Brussels 2000; Article 24(1) of Brussels 2012). 16 Paragraph 64. 17 Paragraph 65. 18 Ibid. 19 This is stated in the last sentence in paragraph 64 and the first sentence of paragraph 65. agreement; secondly, it does not apply to a decision referring the parties to arbitration or a decision refusing to do so; thirdly, it does not apply to a decision to hear a case despite a claim by one of the parties that it is subject to arbitration. Court proceedings are not, however, excluded from the scope of the Convention merely because, in the view of other courts, they are covered by an arbitration agreement. If a judgment is given in such proceedings, it must be recognized and enforced by courts in other Member States. The recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards, on the other hand, is not covered by the Brussels Convention.
The effect of this is that if there is an agreement providing for arbitration in one Member State (the "seat") and court proceedings are brought in another Member State (the "forum"), a ruling on the validity (or applicability) of the arbitration agreement by the courts of the seat will not be binding under the Convention on the courts of the forum: they will not be precluded from hearing the case. On the other hand, a similar ruling by the courts of the forum would not be binding under the Convention on the courts of the seat. Recognition of a judgment on the substance given by the courts of the forum would be covered by the Convention, but the Convention would not apply to the recognition of the award, even if it was incorporated into a judgment.
The Marc Rich case
The Schlosser Report was published in 1979. More than ten years were to pass before these matters first came before the CJEU. This was in Marc Rich and Co. v. Società Italiana Impianti, 20 which concerned a contract for the sale of crude oil, in which the buyer was a Swiss company (Marc Rich) and the seller an Italian company (Impianti). Marc Rich had made an offer to buy the oil and this was accepted by Impianti, subject to additional terms, which were accepted by Marc Rich. Subsequently, Marc Rich sent a telex to Impianti adding an English choice-of-law clause and an English arbitration clause. There was no reply. The oil was shipped, but Marc Rich claimed contamination. Impianti then brought proceedings before a court in Genoa, Italy, for a declaration of non-liability. It argued that the arbitration clause was not part of the contract.
Marc Rich responded by taking steps to commence arbitration proceedings in London. Impianti refused to appoint its arbitrator; so Marc Rich made an application for the High Court to appoint an arbitrator on Impianti's behalf. Impianti claimed that since the Italian court had been seised prior to the English court, the latter was required to stay its proceedings under the lis pendens provision of the Convention. 21 This states that where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought before the courts of different Contracting States, any court other than the court first seised must, of its own motion, stay the proceedings before it.
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Impianti argued that this provision was applicable because the same question -the validity of the arbitration clause -was in issue in both sets of proceedings.
The English Court of Appeal made a reference to the CJEU, which ruled that the proceedings before the English courts, being ancillary to arbitration proceedings, were outside the scope of the 20 Case C-190/89, [1991] ECR I-3855. According to Advocate General Damon, this was the first time an English court had made a reference to the CJEU on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention. 21 Article 21 of the Convention. Equivalent provisions are to be found in Brussels 2000 (Article 27) and Brussels 2012 (Article 29). 22 Once the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, the other court must decline jurisdiction.
Convention
. 23 This was not affected by the fact that the validity of the arbitration agreement was in issue in both sets of proceedings. The CJEU said:
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In order to determine whether a dispute falls within the scope of the Convention, reference must be made solely to the subject-matter of the dispute. If, by virtue of its subject-matter, such as the appointment of an arbitrator, a dispute falls outside the scope of the Convention, the existence of a preliminary issue which the court must resolve in order to determine the dispute cannot, whatever that issue may be, justify application of the Convention.
The result was that the English proceedings were not barred by the lis pendens rule.
The importance of this case lies in the fact that it establishes, as stated in the Jenard and Schlosser Reports, that court proceedings ancillary to arbitration proceedings are outside the scope of the Convention.
The case also establishes that, in determining whether a matter falls within the scope of the Convention, regard must be had solely to the subject-matter ("objet", in French) of the proceedings, not to any incidental question raised by either of the parties. 25 If the objet of the proceedings is outside the scope of the Convention, the proceedings are not brought within its scope just because an incidental issue relates to a matter within its scope. 26 As we shall see, this rule has been applied in later cases. As we shall also see, however, it is subject to an important qualification.
The proceedings before the CJEU took over two years. 27 During this period, the Italian proceedings were moving forward. Marc Rich filed an objection to the jurisdiction of the Genoa court: it argued that the arbitration clause was part of the contract. This issue was taken on appeal to the highest court in Italy, the Corte di Cassazione, which held that the arbitration clause was not part of the contract. This ruling was given approximately six months before the CJEU delivered its judgment. The case then recommenced before the Genoa court. Marc Rich could have walked away from the proceedings; instead, it decided to contest the claim on the substance by lodging pleadings with the Genoa court in May 1991.
When the English proceedings began again after the judgment of the CJEU, Marc Rich asked the High Court in London to issue an antisuit injunction precluding Impianti from taking further steps in the Italian proceedings. This was refused by Hobhouse J on the ground that, by pleading to the merits of the claim before the court in Genoa in May 1991, Marc Rich had submitted to its 23 Paragraphs 19 and 21 of the judgment. Reference was made to the Schlosser Report. 24 Paragraph 26 of the judgment. 25 The "objet" of proceedings is the principal claim or remedy sought. This might be an order for the payment of damages, a declaration of non-liability or an order for the appointment of an arbitrator. It is to be distinguished from a preliminary, or incidental, question, which is another issue which must be decided in order to decide the principal claim. 26 According to the Schlosser Report (above), the question whether an arbitration agreement is valid is itself outside the scope of the Convention. If this is correct -which it certainly is under Brussels 2012 -the English proceedings would not have been covered even if their objet had been the validity of the arbitration agreement -for example, if the claim had simply been for a declaration on the point. 27 The order of the Court of Appeal was made on 26 January 1989, but was not received by the CJEU until 31 May 1989. The judgment of the CJEU was delivered on 25 July 1991. 33 Section 32(4)(a) of the Act (as amended). 34 Section 32(1)(c). Section 32(3) provides that, in deciding whether to recognize a foreign judgment, a court in the United Kingdom is not bound by a ruling of the foreign court as to any of the matters mentioned in section 32(1) or 32(2). This means that it is not bound by a ruling of the foreign court as to whether there was submission. 35 This provision is also subject to the Brussels I Regulation: Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, section 33(2) (as amended).
Asset-freezing orders
Does the Regulation apply to asset-freezing orders granted in aid of arbitration? It might be thought that they were ancillary to arbitration and consequently outside the scope of the Regulation. However, they are not quite the same as orders for the appointment of an arbitrator or the other examples given by Schlosser. The latter are part of the arbitration process and the law applicable might reasonably be regarded as part of the law of arbitration. Preliminary measures in support of arbitration are different. Although their function in a given case might be to support arbitration, they can equally well be used to support claims subject to litigation. The applicable law is not part of the law of arbitration: they are independent measures. This is what the CJEU held in Van Uden v. DecoLine, 36 a case concerning an interim-payment order, 37 granted as a provisional measure by a Dutch court in support of arbitration. While accepting that court proceedings ancillary to arbitration are outside the scope of the Convention, the CJEU held that the question whether a preliminary measure in support of arbitration falls within the scope of the Convention depends, not on the nature of the measure, but on the nature of the rights it protects. 38 The CJEU said that if the subjectmatter (objet) of the substantive claim falls within the scope of the Convention, the Convention is applicable to provisional measures granted in support of it, even if the claim is subject to arbitration. Since the claim before the Dutch arbitrators was for breach of contract, the interim-payment order was covered.
This does not mean that provisional measures cannot be granted in aid of arbitration; however, where the defendant is domiciled in another Member State, they must be permitted by the Regulation. The relevant provision today is Article 31 of Brussels 2000 (Article 24 of the Convention), 39 which allows a court without jurisdiction over the substance of a case to grant such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under its national law. In Van Uden, the CJEU said that where the case is subject to arbitration, the courts of no Member State have jurisdiction over the substance; so resort must always be had to this provision. Therefore, assetfreezing orders in aid of arbitration may be granted against a party domiciled in another Member State only in terms of Article 31. Under this, they must be restricted to property within the territory of the Member State in which they are made: world-wide orders are not allowed.
II. ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS
At this point, we must change focus and consider antisuit injunctions, since they are the obvious remedy where a claim regarded by English law as subject to an English arbitration clause is brought before the courts of another country. Antisuit injunctions were invented in England (originally as a weapon used by the courts of equity in their battle with the courts of common law) and, though they have spread to the United States and other common-law jurisdictions, they appear to be used more widely in England than anywhere else.
Turner v. Grovit
The first case in which antisuit injunctions were considered by the CJEU was Turner v. Grovit, a case which did not involve arbitration. 41 The basic facts were that an English employee of a company incorporated in Ireland but with its central management in England brought proceedings against the company in England for constructive wrongful dismissal. The constructive dismissal had taken place in Spain, where he had been working temporarily in the office of an associated Spanish company, while still an employee of the English company. After final judgment (in favour of the employee) had been given in the English proceedings, the Spanish company brought proceedings against the employee in Spain. These proceedings were an attempt to relitigate the issues already decided in England. 42 The English Court of Appeal granted an antisuit injunction. The House of Lords made a reference to the CJEU, which held that such injunctions may not be granted to restrain proceedings in another EU State. The UK Government argued that they should at least be permitted in the case of proceedings brought in bad faith, but this was rejected by the CJEU.
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The CJEU reached this conclusion as follows: first, it said that the jurisdictional provisions of the Convention may be interpreted with equal authority by the courts of each Contracting State; 44 then it stated that, except in a small number of exceptional cases, the Convention does not permit the jurisdiction of a court in one Member State to be reviewed by a court in another Member State. 45 It concluded: 46 However, a prohibition imposed by a court, backed by a penalty, restraining a party from commencing or continuing proceedings before a foreign court undermines the latter court's jurisdiction to determine the dispute. Any injunction prohibiting a claimant from bringing such an action must be seen as constituting interference with the jurisdiction of the foreign court which, as such, is incompatible with the system of the Convention.
From this, it will be seen that the objection to antisuit injunctions is that they permit the courts of one Contracting State to impose their views on the courts of another Contracting State regarding the right of the latter to hear a case. They do this by supporting the injunction with the threat of contempt proceedings, which could result in the party concerned being fined, having his assets sequestrated or even being put in prison. As a result, the court in which the foreign proceedings are pending never has the opportunity to decide the matter for itself. 42 The Spanish claim was for damages for the employee's "unjustified departure" from the Spanish office and for his bringing a "baseless" claim in England. 43 The CJEU said that a determination as to whether the Spanish proceedings were abusive was for the Spanish court, not the English court, to make: paragraph 28 of the judgment. 44 Paragraph 25 of the judgment. 45 Paragraph 26 of the judgment. 46 Paragraph 27 of the judgment.
West Tankers
the Regulation. 47 We therefore come back to the question considered previously: what is the scope of the Regulation with regard to arbitration?
The leading case on this question (with regard to antisuit injunctions) is West Tankers. 48 The case arose when a ship belonging to West Tankers hit a jetty in Syracuse, Italy, causing considerable damage. The jetty was owned by Erg, an Italian company. Erg claimed against its insurance company, Allianz, for the damage to the jetty. Allianz compensated Erg up to the limit of the coverage under the policy. Erg then claimed against West Tankers for the remainder of the loss. Since the ship had been on charter to Erg at the time of the accident, and since the charterparty contained an English arbitration clause, Erg began arbitration proceedings against West Tankers in London.
However, because Allianz had partly indemnified Erg, Allianz was subrogated to Erg's rights against West Tankers to the extent to which it (Allianz) had paid Erg. 49 Allianz brought proceedings against West Tankers before a court in Syracuse to recover this amount. It claimed that the court had jurisdiction to hear the case under Article 5(3) of Brussels 2000 (the relevant provision at the time). This confers jurisdiction, with regard to a claim in tort, on the courts for the place where the "harmful event" occurred. The harmful event had occurred in Syracuse, where the jetty was located.
West Tankers took the view that, since Allianz's right to bring the claim derived from Erg, the claim was subject to the same conditions as applied between it (West Tankers) and Erg. As the arbitration agreement undoubtedly applied as between West Tankers and Erg, West Tankers considered that it also applied as between it (West Tankers) and Allianz. So it contested the jurisdiction of the court in Syracuse; it also brought proceedings before the High Court in London for a declaration that the arbitration agreement covered the claim, and for an antisuit injunction restraining Allianz from pursuing the claim before the court in Syracuse. These were granted by the High Court. Allianz appealed, and the House of Lords made a reference to the CJEU to ascertain whether the prohibition against antisuit injunctions applied when the injunction was granted on the ground that the foreign proceedings were contrary to an arbitration agreement.
This raised the question whether the arbitration exclusion insulated the antisuit injunction from the effects of the rule in Turner v. Grovit. The argument in favour of this view was that the proceedings in which the injunction was granted were outside the scope of the Regulation. The CJEU agreed that they were; 50 nevertheless, it ruled that the prohibition against antisuit injunctions still 47 This seems to follow from the judgment of the CJEU in Turner v. Grovit, in which it was stated (in paragraph 27 of the judgment) that an antisuit injunction would be "incompatible with the system of the Convention." However, in West Tankers, the CJEU put the matter slightly differently. It said (in paragraph 29 of the judgment) that an antisuit injunction would be contrary to a "general principle which emerges from the caselaw of the Court on the Brussels Convention." This could be regarded as an indication of a change in the court's thinking. Perhaps the CJEU will decide in the future that there is a general principle of EU law that Member States must respect the sovereignty of other Member States. If accepted, this principle might preclude antisuit injunctions even outside the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. It should be said that "general principles" are a recognized source of EU law and have been applied in many situations. 29 It follows … that an anti-suit injunction, such as that in the main proceedings, is contrary to the general principle which emerges from the case-law of the Court on the Brussels Convention, that every court seised itself determines, under the rules applicable to it, whether it has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute before it…
This judgment thus lays down the rule that, in order to determine whether the prohibition against antisuit injunctions applies in a given case, one must consider, not whether the proceedings in which the injunction was granted fall within the scope of the Regulation, but whether the proceedings against which the injunction is directed fall within its scope. These were the proceedings in Syracuse.
In order to determine whether the proceedings in Syracuse were within the scope of the Regulation, the CJEU applied the principle, laid down in Marc Rich v. Impianti (above), that one must look to the subject-matter ("objet") of those proceedings. The "objet" of the Syracuse proceedings was a claim for damages. This came within the scope of the Regulation; consequently, the preliminary question before the court in Syracuse -the validity and scope of the arbitration clausealso came within the scope of the Regulation. 52 If the "objet" of the proceedings falls within the scope of the Regulation, all ancillary questions to be decided in the course of those proceedings also fall within its scope. Consequently, the English courts had no right to grant the injunction.
Although this decision met with a hostile reception in England, 53 it is not lacking in legal logic. The reason court proceedings ancillary to arbitration are normally excluded from the scope of the Regulation is that they relate more to arbitration than to civil (court) proceedings, the subjectmatter of the Regulation. In the case of an antisuit injunction, however, the position is different. Although the injunction affects arbitration -it protects it from interference -it has an even greater effect on the proceedings against which it is directed, since, if the injunction is obeyed, those proceedings will be stopped in their tracks. For this reason, it makes sense to say that the prohibition against antisuit injunctions applies whenever the proceedings against which the injunction is directed are within the scope of the Regulation.
III. ORDERS BY ARBITRATORS NOT TO LITIGATE
The next topic to consider is the effect of the Brussels Regulation on orders given by arbitrators requiring parties to discontinue court proceedings in another Member State. This question has recently come before the courts of Lithuania.
The Government of Lithuania, acting through its Ministry of Energy ("the Government"), had brought proceedings in Lithuania in connection with energy supplies by Gazprom to Lithuania.
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Gazprom claimed that the proceedings were contrary to a contract it had concluded, which provided for arbitration in Stockholm. Gazprom commenced proceedings before the arbitrators in Stockholm and an award was made under which it was held that certain aspects of the claims made by the Government before the courts of Lithuania were contrary to the arbitration agreement. The arbitrators ordered the Government to withdraw these claims. Gazprom then applied for recognition and enforcement of the order in Lithuania. This was refused by the Court of Appeal of Lithuania.
56 Gazprom appealed to the Supreme Court of Lithuania, which made a reference to the CJEU.
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In the order for reference, the Supreme Court characterized the order in the award as an antisuit injunction and asserted that, by ruling that certain claims before the Lithuanian courts were contrary to the arbitration agreement, the arbitrators were restricting the Lithuanian courts' right to determine for themselves whether they had jurisdiction under Brussels I. In other words, the Supreme Court considered that the rule prohibiting antisuit injunctions was applicable. It asked the CJEU whether the courts of Lithuania had the right to refuse to recognize the award. It will be some time before the CJEU gives a ruling on this question; nevertheless, we can consider what the answer should be. . The issues raised in these proceedings will be considered below. 55 The exact nature of these proceedings is not clear from the order for reference. 56 The grounds of refusal are not clear from the order for reference, but it is likely that they were based on Article V(2)(a) or V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. 57 Gazprom v. Lithuania, Case C-536/13 (CJEU, not yet decided). The order for reference was accepted by the CJEU on 27 November 2013.
The vital question is whether it is correct to characterize the order given by the arbitrators as an antisuit injunction. The rule that Brussels I prohibits antisuit injunctions directed against proceedings in other Member States was, as we have seen, first laid down in Turner v. Grovit. The rationale of the rule (as we have also seen) is that an antisuit injunction prevents a court before which proceedings are brought from determining for itself whether it has jurisdiction to hear them. In Turner v. Grovit, the CJEU defined an antisuit injunction as "a prohibition imposed by a court, backed by a penalty, restraining a party from commencing or continuing proceedings before a foreign court". 58 The order in the Gazprom case was not backed by a penalty. This goes to the heart of the matter since it is clear from Turner that the objection to antisuit injunctions is that they permit the courts of one Member State to impose their views on the courts of another Member State regarding the right of the latter to hear a case. They do this by the threat of contempt proceedings, which could result in the party concerned being fined, having his assets sequestrated or even being put in prison. As a result, the courts where the proceedings are being heard never have the opportunity to decide the matter for themselves. The claimant will discontinue them without further ado.
This rationale does not apply to an order which is not backed by a penalty. If there is no penalty for disobedience, the only way the order can be made effective is for the court against which it is directed to accept it and decline jurisdiction. It was for this reason that Gazprom asked the Lithuanian courts to enforce the order. If Gazprom had gone to the Swedish courts for an order, supported by contempt penalties, precluding the Government from bringing proceedings in the Lithuanian courts, that would have been covered by the ruling in West Tankers. If the arbitrators themselves had imposed penalties, that would also have been covered (see below). However, neither of these was the case; so the order was outside the scope of the rule in Turner and West Tankers.
To extend the scope of the rule to cover an order which is not supported by penalties would be going too far. There are several situations in which a finding that one court has jurisdiction necessarily implies that another court does not have it. If the first court has jurisdiction to determine for itself whether it has jurisdiction, the same must also apply to the second court or to arbitrators. To determine whether they have jurisdiction, arbitrators must decide whether the arbitration agreement is valid and applicable. If they rule that it is, this necessarily means that courts in other Member States do not have jurisdiction. There is no reason why they should not say so. In the Gazprom case, the arbitrators would have failed in their duty to interpret and apply the arbitration agreement if they had not given a ruling as to whether it precluded the proceedings in Lithuania. As long as they do not seek to enforce it by imposing penalties, there can be no objection.
Once it is established that the prohibition against antisuit injunctions in not applicable, it is clear that EU law in general, and the Regulation in particular, have no role to play. Recognition of arbitration awards is outside the scope of the Regulation. This was stated as long ago as 1979 by the Jenard Report, 59 which expressly said that the Brussels Convention did not apply to the recognition of awards. 60 Recognition of awards is a matter for the New York Convention; however, the European Union is not a Party to this and the CJEU has no jurisdiction to interpret it. The Regulation neither 58 Paragraph 27 of the judgment, set out above. 59 OJ 1979, C 59, p. 1. 60 OJ 1979, C 59, p. 1 at p. 13. For Brussels 2012, see Recital 12, paragraph 4.
requires nor precludes recognition of the award in the Gazprom case. That is a matter for the Lithuanian courts to decide for themselves. The CJEU has no jurisdiction.
IV. BRUSSELS 2012
In 2012, the European Union adopted a recast version of the Brussels Regulation, which applies from 10 January 2015. 61 Arbitration was a major issue in the negotiations. Any hopes that West Tankers might be reversed were soon dispelled. One way in which this could have been done would have been to provide that a ruling by the courts of the seat of the arbitration on the validity or applicability of the arbitration agreement would be binding on the courts of other Member States.
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As applied to West Tankers, this would have meant that the courts in Italy would have been obliged to follow a ruling by the English courts that the arbitration clause was applicable as between Allianz and Test Tankers. However, the Member States did not adopt such an amendment; instead, more modest changes were made.
The New York Convention
The exclusion of arbitration was retained in Brussels 2012 without alteration. The only new provision of a substantive nature was Article 73(2), which provides that the Brussels I Regulation does not affect the application of the 1958 New York Convention.
In Brussels 2000, there is no provision referring expressly to the New York Convention; however, Article 71 (1) 63 might be regarded as having the same effect. This provides:
This Regulation shall not affect any conventions to which the Member States are parties and which, in relation to particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of judgments.
The New York Convention applies with regard to a particular matter: arbitration. It could govern the jurisdiction of courts because it provides that when a court of a Contracting State is seised of an action in respect of which the parties have concluded an arbitration agreement, the court must, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration (unless the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed). 64 It could also affect the recognition or enforcement of judgments. It requires an arbitral award to be recognized and enforced (subject to exceptions). 65 If the award is irreconcilable with a judgment, this necessarily precludes recognition of the judgment. To this extent, it governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments. 2000 would also be subject to it. If this is correct, Article 73(2) of Brussels 2012 does not change the position; nevertheless, it is desirable for the matter to be put beyond doubt.
Since the New York Convention imposes a limit on the application of the Brussels I Regulation, it is necessary to consider how it is interpreted. One obvious difference between the two instruments is that, while the CJEU ensures that the Regulation is interpreted uniformly in all the States in which it applies, there is no equivalent court with regard to the New York Convention: the courts of each Contracting State decide for themselves how it should be interpreted. Although all the EU Member States are Parties to the New York Convention, the Union itself is not a Party; so the CJEU has no jurisdiction to interpret it. 66 Even within the Union, therefore, the courts of each Member State interpret it for themselves.
The consequence of this is that an instrument which the courts of each Member State are free to interpret for themselves imposes a limit on the application of an EU measure, the Brussels I Regulation. A somewhat analogous situation arises under the rule that the courts of Member States may refuse to recognize judgments from other Member States on grounds of public policy. 67 Since it is for each Member State to decide for itself what its public policy requires, this also constitutes a limit of uncertain scope on the application of the Brussels I Regulation. However, the CJEU has decided that it has the power to lay down the outer boundaries of Member State jurisdiction in this regard: it is only within those boundaries that the courts of Member States can refuse, on public policy grounds, to recognize a judgment from another Member State. 68 In this way, the CJEU has sought to avoid the establishment of an open-ended escape mechanism from the obligation to recognize judgments under the Regulation. It remains to be seen whether the CJEU will impose a similar limit on the freedom of Member-State courts to interpret the New York Convention in a way which imposes unreasonable restrictions on the application of the Brussels I Regulation.
The recitals
EU regulations normally begin with recitals, which are intended to provide guidance on the interpretation of the substantive provisions. Brussels 2012 contains a large number of recitals, and 66 Article 267(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) gives the CJEU jurisdiction, on a reference from a court of a Member State, to interpret acts of an EU institution. In Haegeman v. Belgium, Case 181/73, [1974] ECR 449, the CJEU held that an international agreement concluded by the Union (then the Community) with one or more non-member States constitutes an act of an EU institution for this purpose. In this way, the CJEU obtained jurisdiction to interpret such agreements. In SPI, Cases 267-9/81, [1983] ECR 801, the CJEU extended its jurisdiction to cover the original GATT, even though the original GATT had not been concluded by the Union (Community). It did this on the ground that the subject-matter of the original GATT, tariffs and trade, had since become a matter of exclusive Union (Community) competence. However, this reasoning cannot apply to the New York Convention because arbitration is not an area of exclusive Union competence. If arbitration had been brought within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation -for example, by providing that a judgment of a court of a Member State on the validity or applicability of an arbitration agreement was subject to recognition under the Regulation -that would have weakened the case for saying that the CJEU has no jurisdiction to interpret the New York Convention. It might also have opened the way for the Union to claim treaty-making power in one of them concerns arbitration. This is Recital 12, which may be regarded as an aid to the interpretation of the provision excluding arbitration from the scope of the Regulation and to the provision that the New York Convention prevails over the Regulation. There are four paragraphs to Recital 12 and we will consider each in turn.
The first paragraph begins by stating that the Regulation does not apply to arbitration. This is expressly stated in Article 1(2)(d); however, by repeating it at the beginning of Recital 12, it is made clear that the recital is intended to clarify the interpretation of Article 1(2)(d).
The first paragraph of Recital 12 goes on to state that nothing in the Regulation prevents the courts of a Member State, when seised of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, from:
 referring the parties to arbitration,  staying or dismissing the proceedings, or  examining whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
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Recital 12 states that this is to be done according to the national law of the Member State in question, thus making clear that EU law does not apply.
The next paragraph provides that a ruling by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed 70 is not subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement in the Regulation, regardless of whether the court decided it as a principal issue or as an incidental question. Although this provision does not expressly apply to rulings on the applicability of an arbitration agreement, 71 there is little doubt that this too is covered.
The paragraph makes clear that such a ruling does not have to be recognized, regardless of what the objet was of the proceedings in which it was granted. It could therefore be regarded as an exception to the rule laid down in the Marc Rich case that, for the purpose of determining the scope of the Regulation, incidental questions must be characterized on the basis of the objet of the proceedings. Consequently, the court before which substantive proceedings are pending can decide for itself, according to its own law, 72 whether those proceedings are subject to an arbitration agreement; however, its ruling is not binding under the Regulation on the courts of other Member States. The latter can make up their own minds on the issue, according to their own law.
If we take the Marc Rich case as an example, the Recital means that a ruling by the Italian courts that the arbitration clause was not part of the contract would not be binding under the 69 These rules could also be regarded as being derived from the New York Convention. 70 These are the words of Article II(3) of the New York Convention. 71 This is the question whether an arbitration agreement applies to a given dispute. This can involve deciding whether the dispute comes within the scope of the agreement; it can also involve deciding whether an agreement is binding on third parties, as occurred in the West Tankers case. 72 This will include the New York Convention, as interpreted under its law.
Regulation on the English courts; however, a ruling to the opposite effect by the English courts would not be binding under the Regulation on the Italian courts.
The third paragraph of the Recital states that where a court of a Member State, exercising jurisdiction under the Regulation or under national law, 73 has determined that an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, this does not preclude the court's judgment on the substance from being recognised and enforced under the Regulation. This establishes that the view expressed by the United Kingdom at the time of the negotiations for UK adhesion to the Brussels Convention is not correct. Proceedings before a court are not excluded from the scope of the Regulation just because they are, in the view of other Member States, covered by an arbitration agreement. The fact that the court of origin took jurisdiction after deciding that an arbitration agreement was invalid or inapplicable does not disentitle the resulting judgment from recognition and enforcement under the Regulation.
However, the third paragraph provides that this is without prejudice to the competence of the courts of the Member States to decide on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in accordance with the 1958 New York Convention, which (as we have seen) takes precedence over the Regulation. The effect of this will be considered below.
Finally, the Recital confirms the established view that the Regulation does not apply to any action or ancillary proceedings relating to, in particular, the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, the powers of arbitrators, the conduct of an arbitration procedure or any other aspects of such a procedure, nor to any action or judgment concerning the annulment, review, appeal, recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award. Such proceedings are not affected by the Regulation -for example, with regard to jurisdiction and the application of the lis pendens rule; it also means that judgments and orders given in such proceedings are not subject to recognition under the Regulation.
The effect of Recital 12 is that the law discussed above continues to apply. This includes the judgments of the CJEU in Marc Rich and West Tankers. However, the Recital clarifies a number of matters, especially the situation where a court gives a judgment in a dispute which, in the view of a court in another Member State, is subject to an arbitration agreement.
From all this, it will be seen that the policy of the European Union is to establish a reasonable balance between arbitration and litigation as alternative methods of dispute resolution. There is no general policy that arbitration should prevail over litigation, though, by giving precedence to the New York Convention, the Regulation ensures that awards trump judgments in certain circumstances. 73 The reference to jurisdiction under national law is concerned with the situation in which the jurisdictional rules of the Regulation are inapplicable because the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State. In such a situation, the court would take jurisdiction under its national rules of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, its judgment must still be recognized and enforced under the Regulation. Although the jurisdictional rules of the Regulation are (generally speaking) dependent on domicile, the rules on the recognition and enforcement of judgments are not.
Having considered the new Regulation, we can complete our survey by discussing the remaining issues.
V. INJUNCTIONS PROHIBITING ARBITRATION
If a court grants an injunction precluding parties from resorting to arbitration, that order would be outside the scope of the Regulation. 74 The proceedings against which it was directed would be outside the scope of the Regulation, since the Regulation does not apply to arbitration. Even if the objet of the proceedings in which it was granted was within the scope of the Regulation and, as a result, those proceedings were within the scope of the Regulation, the ruling in West Tankers means that the prohibition against antisuit injunctions would not apply. However, the injunction (and any accompanying declaration) would also be outside the scope of the Regulation for recognition purposes: courts in other Member States would not be required by the Regulation to recognize and enforce it. They would be free to make up their own minds. If they considered that the arbitration agreement was valid and applicable, they would no doubt refuse to give effect to the injunction. Since a ruling on the validity and applicability of the arbitration agreement is not itself entitled to recognition under the Regulation, 75 the court in which the arbitration was pending would not be bound by any such ruling. Thus, in West Tankers, if the court in Syracuse had given an injunction requiring Allianz not to continue with the arbitration in London, the Regulation would not have required the English courts to give effect to it.
VI. DAMAGES FOR LITIGATING IN THE "WRONG" COURT
We are now in a position to consider a question raised in the English courts in the West Tankers case after the judgment of the CJEU had been given: can arbitrators award damages against a party for bringing court proceedings in another Member State if the arbitrators consider that those proceedings were brought in violation of an arbitration agreement? It will be remembered that in West Tankers the English High Court originally granted two remedies, a declaration that the arbitration agreement applied as between Allianz and West Tankers and an antisuit injunction. After the CJEU had ruled that the antisuit injunction was contrary to the Regulation, the House of Lords rescinded it; however, the declaration still stood.
The arbitrators then ruled that West Tankers was under no liability to Allianz. Subsequently, West Tankers asked the arbitrators to award it damages for the loss it had suffered by reason of the fact that Allianz had "wrongfully" sued it in Syracuse. Such damages would have covered, first, the legal fees and expenses necessarily incurred in defending the Italian proceedings; and, secondly, indemnification against any damages that might be granted by the Syracuse court. 76 The arbitrators held (by a majority) that such an award would be precluded by the decision of the CJEU. West Tankers appealed against this ruling to the High Court under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996. In the High Court, Flaux J held that the arbitrators had been wrong to hold that an award of damages for breach of the arbitration agreement would be contrary to the CJEU judgment. 77 He considered that such an award would be no more than a reflection of the ruling on the substance, namely that West Tankers was under no liability to Allianz. 78 An award of damages for bringing proceedings in the courts of another Member State in violation of an arbitration agreement necessarily involves a finding that the arbitration agreement was valid and applicable; this in turn involves a finding that the court before which the proceedings were brought had no jurisdiction to hear the case. It was said above that courts and arbitrators in one Member State should be entitled to give a ruling on the validity or applicability of an arbitration agreement. They should even be entitled to rule that the bringing of proceedings in the courts of another Member State is contrary to the arbitration agreement. However, if they go further and support such a ruling by the threat of penalties or damages, they are trespassing on the domain of the courts of the other Member State. 79 They are trying to enforce their view on those courts instead of letting them take the final decision themselves. Imposing damages for suing in the "wrong" court would prevent the party concerned from even trying to sue in the other Member State. Such a ruling would be an antisuit injunction in all but name.
It is of course true that proceedings before arbitrators and proceedings before courts in an appeal against an award are outside the scope of the Regulation. However, as we have seen, the applicability of the prohibition against antisuit injunctions does not depend on whether the proceedings in which the injunction was granted are within the scope of the Regulation but on whether the proceedings against which it is directed are within the scope of the Regulation. The proceedings before the court in Syracuse were within the scope of the Regulation; so the prohibition against antisuit injunctions (or orders having an equivalent effect) was applicable to the proceedings before the High Court. It was also applicable to proceedings before the arbitrators. The arbitrators were right in their ruling.
VII. RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS
We finally come to the recognition and enforcement of judgments, on the one hand, and awards, on the other. Since the CJEU has not pronounced on this question, we have to proceed with caution.
We have already seen that the recognition of arbitration awards is outside the scope of the Regulation. Such recognition is governed by the New York Convention. On the other hand, the recognition and enforcement of a judgment cannot be refused on the ground that the courts of the Member State in which recognition is sought consider that the court of origin ought to have referred the parties to arbitration. 80 From this, it follows that if there is a judgment but no award, the judgment 81 must be recognized and enforced in other Member States. 82 The fact that the courts of the Member State in which recognition is sought consider that the courts of origin took jurisdiction contrary to an arbitration agreement is not a ground for refusing to recognize the judgment. Nor would it make any difference if arbitration proceedings were pending between the parties in the Member State in which recognition was sought. There is no provision in the New York Convention which applies in this situation. Only an unacceptably broad interpretation would lead to the conclusion that it precludes the recognition of a judgment because it might conflict with an award which might be given in the future. Once recognized, the judgment would constitute res judicata between the parties and thus put an end to the arbitration proceedings.
If there is an award but no judgment, it would seem equally clear that the Brussels I Regulation would not preclude recognition and enforcement of the award. 83 Once recognized, this too would be binding as between the parties and would put an end to any parallel proceedings in the courts of the Member State in question. However, since it is for the courts of each Party to the New York Convention to interpret the Convention for themselves, the courts of the latter Member State might decide that one of the exceptions to recognition was applicable.
What if the judgment and award were both given at more or less the same time and neither was invoked in the other proceedings before a final judgment or award was given? In this situation, there would be both a judgment and an award between the same parties which, we assume, are in conflict. We first consider the position in a third Member State, one which is neither that in which the judgment was given, nor that in which the award was made. The courts of that State would be faced with two seemingly conflicting obligations. Under the Brussels I Regulation, they would be required to recognize the judgment and under the New York Convention, they would be required to recognize the award. 84 When conflicting judgments are given by the courts of different Member States, the solution laid down by the Brussels I Regulation is that third Member States must recognize the earlier judgment. 85 However, this does not apply in the case of an award: since the New York Convention 80 Brussels 2012, Recital 12, paragraph 3, first sentence. The same is almost certainly true under Brussels 2000. 81 It is assumed that the judgment is not outside the scope of the Regulation. As we have seen, a judgment on the validity or applicability of an arbitration agreement is not subject to recognition under the Regulation, regardless of whether it was decided as a principal issue or as an incidental question. 82 A judgment from another Member State must be recognized without any special procedure being required: Brussels 2000, Article 33(1); Brussels 2012, Article 36(1). Any attempt to delay recognition until after an award had been made would be contrary to the Regulation. 83 However, the Regulation would not require recognition of the award, even if it was incorporated into a judgment. Such a judgment would be outside the scope of the Regulation: Brussels 2012, Recital 12, paragraph 4; Schlosser Report, paragraph 66. 84 We assume that grounds for non-recognition do not exist under either instrument. 85 prevails over the Brussels I Regulation, the award must be recognized, even if the judgment was given first. 86 The judgment would not be recognized to the extent that it conflicted with the award.
We now consider the issue from the point of view of the Member State in which the judgment was given. Since the judgment would not have been given in another Member State, the Brussels I Regulation would not apply. The New York Convention would apply and would require recognition of the award unless some ground for non-recognition was applicable. The courts of that Member State would have to interpret the New York Convention and apply it to the facts of the case. This would be a matter for them. No outside authority, not even the CJEU, could intervene.
We finally consider the matter from the point of view of the Member State in which the award was given. Here the New York Convention would not be applicable: it applies only to the recognition of awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where recognition of the award is sought. 87 Does this mean that the Member State in which the award is made must recognize the judgment, rather than the award? It would be most peculiar if this were the case, since it would mean that an award would have greater effect in other States than in the one in which it was given.
Under the Brussels I Regulation, there is a rule that a judgment from another Member State does not have to be recognized if it conflicts with a judgment between the same parties given in the Member State in which recognition is sought, even if the latter judgment was given subsequently. 88 This provision could be applicable if the award was incorporated in a judgment or if it had the same status or effect as a judgment under the law of the Member State in which it was given. The decision of the CJEU in Hoffmann v. Krieg 89 makes clear that this rule applies even if the local judgment concerns a subject-matter outside the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. If applied in the appropriate way, this provision could provide the solution.
90

VII. CONCLUSIONS
Although some arbitration lawyers felt that the revision of the Brussels I Regulation did not go far enough, the solution finally adopted is probably the best that was possible in the circumstances. Anything more would either have been unacceptable to other Member States or would have entailed undesirable consequences in other respects.
